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Abstract!
! Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with 
a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not 
explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions 
suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother 
fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I 
argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More 
specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional 
objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. I reach this conclusion 
by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes in 
terms of the propositional fail, but that some non-propositional attitudes don’t even 
supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of 
intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who 
hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken.!!!
No doubt, the flora and fauna of psychology have proliferated vastly, and surprising mental processes are 
postulated right and left. Nevertheless, at the heart of the picture, the fundamental explicandum, is the 
organism and its propositional attitudes: what it believes, what it learns, what it wants and fears, what it 
perceives to be the case. !
Fodor (1975: 198)!! !
Propositionalism!
! Philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to propositional attitudes. In fact,  
theorists interested in intentional states have focused almost exclusively on them, some 
even explicitly maintaining that all intentional states are propositional attitudes. This is 
unfortunate, for there are a class of intentional states that do not relate individuals to 
propositions, nor do they depend on relations to propositions. More specifically, there 
are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do so not in virtue of 
relating them to propositions. Examples include loving, liking, hating, and fearing, 
though there are likely many more. If this is correct, then the common discussions of 
intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who 
hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken.!
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! Focusing on the propositional and neglecting the apparently non-propositional 
attitudes is indeed commonplace, but the neglect is the result of a number of distinct 
thoughts concerning intentionality and the attitudes. First, some theorists simply take 
the intentional and the propositional to be one and the same. For example, Daniel 
Stoljar offers the following:!
In one formulation, the problem of intentionality is presented as 
concerning a particular class of properties, intentional properties. 
Intentional properties are those properties expressed by predicates 
formed from verbs of propositional attitudes. (Stoljar 1996: 161)!
In similar spirit, John Perry writes:!
The phenomenon of intentionality suggests that attitudes are essentially 
relational in nature: they involve relations to the propositions at which they 
are directed. (Perry 1994: 387-8)!
And along the same lines, some take it to be simply definitive of propositions 
themselves that they are the objects of the attitudes. For instance, McGrath (2007) 
writes, ‘Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the 
primary bearers of truth and falsity.’!
! A second thought that has led to the neglect of the apparently non-propositional 
attitudes has it that the propositional attitudes are the most fundamental and all other 
intentionality reduces to them. Theorists who endorse such a thought do no define the 
apparently non-propositional attitudes away, but they treat them as merely derivative 
and not the central cases. For example, George Bealer (1982; 1993) holds that whereas 
the apparently non-propositional states such as loving, fearing, and so on have 
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‘mediated intentionality’, propositional attitudes are (metaphysically) the most 
fundamental intentional states. Intentionality, he says ‘arises from propositional objects, 
i.e. from the thought to which a person stands in the relation of thought, belief, 
judgement, etc.’ (1982: 225). Later, fleshing out the position more completely, Bealer 
argues that in order to (say) fear or like some object, one must stand in some 
appropriate propositional attitude relation to an appropriate proposition concerning the 
object (1993: 115). Accordingly, his discussion then focuses on propositional attitudes.!
! In a similar vein to Bealer, Mark Sainsbury (2010: 315) holds that ‘[t]hinking about 
an object reduces to a proposition-related activity’. (He takes ‘thinking-about’ to be a 
central case from which a more general position follows.) In support, he offers what 
appears to be a supervenience relation between the propositional and apparently non-
propositional attitudes:!
To think about something is to entertain a suitably related internally 
singular propositional content. For example, for John to think about 
Pegasus is for John to stand in some attitudinative relation to a 
propositional content expressible using ‘Pegasus.’ The content might be 
that Pegasus flies, though no restriction is placed. The attitude might be 
that of believing or imagining or simply entertaining the proposition; again, 
there’s no restriction. (Sainsbury 2010: 314)!
! Let us say that ‘Propositionalism’ is the metaphysical thesis (which will be 
explicated in greater detail below) that the most fundamental objects of the attitudes are 
propositions. As I am using the term, the above theorists are all propositionalists and 
are my primary targets. But as noted at the outset, my thesis has wider reach, for even 
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amongst those who are open to the possibility of irreducibly non-propositional attitudes, 
there has been a strong preference for discussing only propositional attitudes. I wish to 
persuade such philosophers that not only is a careful treatment of the non-propositional 
attitudes in order but that a discussion of them in their own right is in order. For an 
example of the kind of philosopher I have in mind, one may look to Tyler Burge who, in 
his famous ‘Individualism and the Mental’, writes:!
Our ordinary mentalistic discourse divides broadly into two sorts of idiom. 
One typically makes reference to mental states or events in terms of 
sentential expressions. The other does not. A clear case of the first kind of 
idiom is ‘Alfred thinks that his friends’ sofa is ugly.’ A clear case of the 
second sort is ‘Alfred is in pain.’ Thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and so forth 
are typically specified in terms of subordinate sentential clauses, that-
clauses, which may be judged true or false. Pains, feels, tickles, and so 
forth have no special semantical relation to sentences or to truth or falsity. 
There are intentional idioms that fall in the second category on this 
characterization, but that share important semantical features with 
expressions in the first – idioms like ‘Al worships Buicks.’ But I shall not 
sort these out here. I shall discuss only the former kind of mentalistic 
idiom. The extension of the discussion to the other intentional idioms will 
not be difficult.  (Burge 1979: 74)!1
Burge isn’t explicit about the metaphysical relationship between the propositional and 
the non-propositional, but it is clear that he is content to discuss only the propositional. 
John Searle provides another example. In his seminal book on intentionality, he writes:!
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The hypothesis [...] is not that all or even many forms of Intentionality 
reduce to Bel and Des – that is plainly false – but rather that all Intentional 
states, even those which do not have a direction of fit and those which do 
not have a whole proposition as content, nonetheless contain a Bel or a 
Des or both, and that in many cases the Intentionality of the state is 
explained by the Bel or the Des. If that hypothesis is true then the analysis 
of Intentionality in terms of representation of conditions of satisfaction 
under certain aspects and with a certain direction of fit is very general in 
its application and not simply confined to the central cases. To the extent 
that the reader finds this hypothesis plausible, he will find it plausible that 
this book offers the beginnings of a general theory of Intentionality; to the 
extent that he finds it implausible the account will simply be a special 
theory dealing with the large number of central cases. (Searle 1983: 35)!
I, of course, take no issue with philosophers focusing their discussions, but for those 
(like Searle and Burge) who aren’t resistant to the idea that there might be non-
propositional attitudes, I hope to make clear that it is time to bring them to the fore.!
! At this juncture one might reasonably wonder why Propositionalism has been 
adopted and why discussions have tended towards propositional attitudes, so it will be 
helpful to take a very brief look at a few motivations for the view. In fact, the motivations 
suggest that a tacit commitment to Propositionalism may indeed be widespread:!
! (i) Propositions, which stand in logical relations, allow us to properly index the 
mental states and their relations to one another. According to Lewis (1979), we may run 
the risk of losing this feature if the objects of the attitudes are varied. (ii) One might 
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construct motivations for Propositionalism by arguing that without propositional relata 
practical syllogisms will be impossible to construct and a theory of motivation will 
flounder (though, of course, such a motivation rests on particular views about motivation 
and practical syllogism).  (iii) One might also argue, in a similar vein to McDowell (1996) 2
with respect to non-conceptual content, that if the attitudes are related in certain 
interesting epistemic ways (e.g. by the justification relation), then the contents of those 
attitudes must be both conceptual and propositional.  (iv) Russellian accounts of 3
quantified noun phrases, e.g. the F, an F, every F, and so on, (at least on a naive view)  4
require Propositionalism. Russell famously argued that quantified phrases such as the F 
do not contribute denotations to propositions. Rather, they are incomplete symbols that 
combine with predicates and can be shown to involve first order quantification upon 
analysis. But if this is correct and if it is true that (say) Jones fears the Queen of 
England (where the quantified noun phrase takes narrow scope), a Russellian treatment 
will have it that Jones stands in a relation to an existentially quantified proposition to the 
effect that there is exactly one Queen of England.!
! Each of these motivations could be questioned, and they certainly aren’t meant 
to be exhaustive, but for present purposes it is enough to see that the position has 
motivation and is connected with a range of important philosophical positions.!
! Before turning to our discussion, a few terminological clarifications are necessary. 
First, I take attitudes to be intentional mental states. A phenomenon (e.g. a state or an 
event) is intentional if (and only if) it is about something.  For present purposes, we 5
need only the sufficient condition, for I will focus on cases in which there is an object 
such that the phenomenon is about it and not on cases where an object is lacking, such 
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as fearing Pegasus or liking unicorns.  What it is for a state to be mental is a 6
complicated matter, so rather than offer a definition, I will discuss clear cases such as 
fearing, loving, liking, and hating – mental states if any are. It is also important to be 
clear on our comparison class: propositional attitudes are just a special case of the 
intentional, mental states; that is, they are mental relations to propositions which in turn 
are about things such as ordinary objects and properties. In order to avoid confusion, let 
us say that the ‘object’ of a propositional attitude is a proposition. In general, we may 
identify the object of an attitude A by asking ‘what is A-ed?’. It is important to notice that 
what the attitude is about or is directed upon may receive a different answer. For 
example, if I believe that grass is green, one may naturally say that what my belief is 
about is grass, but what I believe is that grass is green. To be a propositional attitude is 
to be an intentional mental state with a proposition for an object. If there are non-
propositional attitudes, they will be intentional mental states with objects that fail to be 
propositions. For instance, if a subject likes Sally, I will argue that the object of his 
attitude is not a proposition concerning Sally, nor does his standing in the liking relation 
to Sally depend upon a propositional attitude.!
!
Prima Facie Problem Cases for Propositionalism!
! Why might one think that there are non-propositional attitudes? That is, why 
might one think that there are intentional, mental relations with non-propositional 
objects? The best way to answer this question is to look at the received motivations for 
thinking that there exist propositional attitudes.!
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! It has been persuasively argued by Fodor (1975; 1983) and Dretske (1991) that 
we should be propositional attitude realists on the grounds that folk-psychological 
explanations of action are both successful and indispensable. Our folk-psychological 
explanations often appeal to propositional attitude ascriptions such as belief and desire, 
and the best explanation of the effectiveness of the folk-theory is that there really are 
propositional attitudes answering to these ascriptions. If one is persuaded by this, it 
takes one as far as realism about the attitudes, but one might still be interested in their 
nature. One might, for example, be concerned over whether or not propositional 
attitudes are indeed relations to propositions. On this front, many theorists have looked 
again to our ascriptions for help, maintaining that they serve as a good guide to the 
metaphysical nature of the attitudes themselves. According to such theorists, there are 
a range of reasons for endorsing a relational view of propositional attitude ascriptions; 
that is, a view according to which propositional attitude ascriptions ascribe a relation 
between an individual and the semantic value of a that-clause; i.e. a proposition.  Allow 7
me to offer two especially persuasive ones. First, we are able to existentially generalize 
over propositional attitude ascriptions, as evidenced by the following intuitively valid 
inference:!
A. John believes that grass is green.!
B. So, there is something John believes.!
A relational view allows one to makes light work of such inferences, claiming that the 
form is as follows:!
! ! A'. B (j,p).!
! ! B'.∃x B(j,x).!
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Second, it seems possible for distinct attitudes to be directed at the same thing. For 
example, Mary might believe that world peace is possible and John might hope that 
world peace is possible. A relational view allows one to explain truth of the claim that 
Mary believes what John hopes in terms of their relation to the same thing.!
! It is difficult to see how to make sense of the above points on a non-relational 
view. For example, if one were to maintain an alternative position according to which 
propositional attitude ascriptions predicate monadic properties of subjects (such as the 
property of believing-that-grass-is-green), an explanation of the truth concerning Mary 
and John and an explanation of the intuitive validities would be anything but 
forthcoming. One could certainly resist the relational position, but many (myself 
included) have found points like those just given very persuasive. So, if one is willing to 
grant that true sentences concerning our attitudes are a good guide to the attitudes 
themselves and if one agrees that attitude ascriptions are relational in form, one should 
conclude that the attitudes themselves are relational in nature.  Since that-clauses very 8
plausibly have propositions as their semantic values, we have a strong case for the view 
that attitudes such as belief are relations to propositions. For most theorists, none of this 
is controversial (in any event, I do not here wish to take issue with these points).!
! But suppose we follow the relational view of propositional attitudes and their 
ascriptions. What are we to make of ascriptions like the following, which take the form ‘S 
V’s y’ (where ‘y’ is a non-that-clause noun phrase):!
1. John fears cats. !
2. Sally loves Bill. !
3. Jones hates the color red. !
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4. Everyone likes chocolate.!
If one is satisfied with the above reasons for being a realist, relationalist about belief, 
desire, and so on, one should be just as satisfied taking fearing, liking, loving, and 
hating to be real relations. Ascriptions like those in 1-4 feature in successful folk-
psychological explanations and predictions of behavior; e.g. all else equal, if a subject 
fears snakes and believes that there are snakes in the pit, he will intend to stay away 
from the pit. Furthermore, for reasons like those given above, the ascriptions are best 
understood relationally. If it is true that Sally fears snakes and Sam likes snakes, we are 
happy to say that Sally fears what Sam likes. And as before, we have intuitively valid 
inferences that are easily explained by a relational view:!
D. Sally loves Nelson Mandela.!
E.So, Sally loves something.!
D. Sally loves Nelson Mandela.!
F. So, there is something Sally loves (namely, Nelson Mandela).!
And the similarities with states like belief and desire run deeper still, for fearing, liking, 
loving, hating, and so on certainly seem to be intentional. Not only are they intuitively 
about things, but they meet further marks of the intentional. Just as one might believe 
that Twain writes without believing that Clemens writes, one might fear Twain but not 
fear Clemens. The attitudes in question, much like belief, are capable of ‘relating’ one to 
things that don’t exist – one can like Sherlock Holmes, fear Pegasus, and so on. (To 
reiterate, I don’t here want to focus on such cases, but their intuitive truth gives one 
good reason for thinking the states are intentional, which is presently what is at issue.) 
But if we take the surface form of the above ascriptions to be (plus or minus a bit) their 
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logical form, then by the same methodology to which we appealed in the case of belief, 
we should conclude that there are intentional relations which relate us to a range of 
non-propositional objects.  Whereas in the case of belief, we found a that-clause, we 9
now find terms and phrases with semantic values other than propositions. Of course, 
this is precisely where the propositionalist will enter the debate, arguing that despite 
appearances, the attitudes reported by 1-4 and their ilk either are propositional attitudes 
or are instantiated only because of them. Let us proceed, then, under the assumption 
that there is indeed a challenge for the propositionalist – she must account for the 
elements of folk-psychology that appear to commit us to attitudes with non-propositional 
objects. In what follows I will argue that there are cases in which propositionalists 
cannot meet the challenge.!
!
Varieties of Propositionalism!
! Before considering whether or not propositionalists can handle the prima facie 
problem cases, we must must further clarify the position. Roughly, as noted at the 
outset, propositionalists maintain that the most fundamental objects of the attitudes are 
propositions. There are at least two forthcoming ways of precisifying this view (where 
the following are meant to be a priori, necessary truths):!
Propositionalism A: !
For every attitudinal relation between a subject and a non-propositional 
object, there is a propositional attitude or attitudes (of that subject’s) in 
terms of which it can be analyzed.!
Propositionalism B: !
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For every attitudinal relation between a subject and a non-propositional 
object, there are propositional attitudes (of that subject’s) upon which it 
supervenes. !10
If Propositionalism A were true, then the most fundamental objects of the attitudes 
would indeed be propositions. According to Propositionalism A, what appear to be non-
propositional attitudes are, upon philosophical inspection, propositional attitudes. 
Propositionalism B is perhaps more tendentious and requires expansion. !11
! Propositionalism B is a weaker and more flexible position than Propositionalism 
A. According to it, when an individual is in a non-propositional, intentional relation at 
time t he is in that relation in virtue of he himself being in some propositional, intentional 
relation at t. For example, suppose it is true that S loves y. Following Crane (2007), 
according to the propositionalist, what makes this true are certain propositional attitude 
facts of the lover. More generally, the propositionalist who adopts option B maintains 
that in order for S to V y, S must bear some or other propositional attitude relation to a 
proposition concerning y and bearing that relation is sufficient for his V-ing y. If true, the 
propositionalist has a good claim to the position that propositions are the fundamental 
objects of the attitudes. In slogan form (paying obvious homage to non-reductive 
physicalists), if Propositionalism B is true, ‘the non-propositional attitudes are nothing 
over and above the propositional attitudes’.!
! Since there are a variety of supervenience relations, a bit more clarification is in 
order. On Propositionalism B, as indicated by the parenthetical ‘of that subject’s’, the 
intended supervenience is local (rather than global).  This is in light of the motivations 12
for the view which, recall, rely on the explanation and prediction of behavior and/or an 
 12
account of certain epistemic relations between intentional states. It is unclear how 
global intentional states would be immediately relevant to these questions (save for the 
usual externalist considerations).  Additionally, the supervenience relation in question is 13
intended to be asymmetric for the obvious reason that the propositionalist holds that the 
non-propositional depends on the propositional, i.e. one is only ever in a non-
propositional attitude in virtue of being in a propositional attitude state (or states).!
!
Against Propositionalism A!
! On the face of things, there are non-propositional attitudes, but sometimes looks 
are deceiving. According to Propositionalism A, S V’s y is to be analyzed as S V’s that y 
is F, for some appropriate F.!
! Counterexamples to Propositionalism A are easy to come by.  For the sake of 14
concreteness, I’ll focus on liking, though there is nothing special about the example.  !15
! Suppose that Tom likes Sally. What shall we offer as an analysis of his attitude? If 
we demand some particular property, we will face immediate worries. For example, 
consider the following:!
S likes Sally iff S likes that Sally is nice.!
But suppose that Tom is a masochist and doesn’t like that Sally is nice. In fact, he takes 
that trait of Sally’s to be a hurdle in their relationship. He may, nevertheless, like Sally. 
So we have a problem: the analysis just offered fails to provide a necessary condition. A 
person like Tom might like y even if he fails to like that y is nice.!
! One might have guessed that specificity to that degree was bound to fail, and in 
its stead the following seems far more attractive:!
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S likes y iff ∃F, S likes that y is F.!
But once again counterexamples are forthcoming: Obama likes that Osama is dead but 
Obama doesn’t (and didn’t) like Osama. Clearly, we have failed to offer a sufficient 
condition.!
! The proper fix appears to be something to which I gestured earlier: restrict 
quantification over F’s in an ‘appropriate’ way. Unfortunately, not only is the restriction 
entirely unclear, but since people often have quite different preferences, perhaps even 
conflicting ones – both Tom and Jones might like Sally, and it might be true that Jones 
likes that she is nice and that Tom fails to like that she is nice – the propositionalist 
faces pressures on both ends. Anything with much specificity is bound to miss some 
cases, but anything broad is bound to overextend.!
! As an alternative, we might try to be specific in one sense while at the same time 
general in another:!
S likes y iff S likes that y causes S (himself) pleasure in some way or 
other.!
But even this suggestion admits of counterexamples. One might like her dog even 
though the dog fails to cause any pleasure. The dog might in fact cause quite a lot of 
displeasure by tearing up the house. And against the other direction, I might like that the 
masseuse makes my back feel better without liking the masseuse.!
! Counterexamples abound, but problems can be shown to run deeper still. 
Beyond the pressure just offered, there are reasons for thinking that Propositionalism A 
is wrong-headed on the grounds of systematic misprediction. By aiming to capture, for 
example, liking in terms of liking-that we predict that what is liked is a state of affairs 
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rather than, say, an individual.  This fact is highlighted by the following. If John likes 16
Sally (and Sally exists), then who John likes is Sally. But notice that for any 
propositionalist treatment of John’s attitude, this entailment is unavailable. If John likes 
that Sally is pretty, it does not follow that who John likes is Sally. The same goes for any 
property that we might fill in. And this is not a special artifact of ‘who’. If John likes Sally, 
then (so long as Sally exists) there is something he likes, namely Sally. But if John likes, 
say, that Sally is pretty, that entailment is again unavailable. There is, of course, 
something he likes when he likes that Sally is pretty, but it is that Sally is pretty. One 
may try other examples for herself, but change the property as you like and the problem 
of displacement remains. If Propositionalism A is adopted, what is intuitively V-ed is 
inappropriately displaced by a state of affairs involving the object in question.!
! Thus far, Propositionalism A looks both hopeless and problematic. One might, of 
course, try other attitudes on the right hand side such as belief or desire, or one might 
try combinations of attitudes. At this juncture, however, I think it is best to turn to 
Propositionalism B. If it fails, any version of Propositionalism A will fail as well.!
! Fortunately for the propositionalist, Propositionalism B promises to help on both 
fronts where Propositionalism A falls short. First, it is a far more flexible view that can 
perhaps avoid counterexamples. Second, it does not aim to analyze away the non-
propositional attitudes and so allows that in, say, liking Sally, Sally is the object of the 
attitude (though, of course, in a mediated way: it is only because the subject in question 





! Propositionalism B is certainly more attractive than Propositionalism A, but it too 
faces difficulties. I will present two lines of pressure. They are intended to be taken 
independently, though given a certain dialectical stance, one might be comfortable with 
the second only in light of the first. If that is the case, the reader may take the first line 
as the primary line of attack.!
! First, I will argue that even with the flexibility afforded by turning to 
supervenience, the required sufficient conditions are often unavailable. Second, I will 
offer a counterexample to the propositionalist position – a case in which two individuals 
are intuitively described as identical with respect to their propositional attitudes, but are 
intuitively distinct with respect to their non-propositional attitudes. The case places a 
burden on the Propositionalist to produce the propositional attitude or attitudes that 
make the difference.!
Line 1!
! Recall that according to the proponent of Propositionalism B, for any token 
instance of S V-ing y, there will be some or other propositional attitude or attitudes 
concerning y which is true of S and that propositional attitude will be sufficient for S’s V-
ing y. I’m skeptical of the claim that propositional attitudes are necessary for being in 
non-propositional attitudes,  but let us grant it: if S V’s y, then S A’s that p (for some or 17
other A and for some or other p). The propositionalist has gained flexibility in what is 
allowable as a necessary condition in each token instance of S V’s y, but once a 
necessary condition (or a range of them) in that instance makes the cut, it (or they) are 
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then said to be sufficient for the token instance of S’s V-ing y. Unfortunately, 
propositionalists cannot meet this sufficiency requirement.!
! An example will be helpful. Suppose that if Jones fears snakes there are some 
propositional attitudes or other that Jones must be in. But what propositional attitude or 
attitudes might be sufficient for his non-occurrent fear? Perhaps that Jones believes that 
snakes are dangerous? Jones, being an experienced snake charmer, might have that 
belief but not fear snakes. Perhaps that Jones believes that snakes are scary (to him)? 
After enough time with his therapist, Jones might come to believe that snakes are scary 
to him, but still not count as fearing snakes. When presented with a snake, Jones, let us 
suppose, wouldn’t react, but when asked, he would freely assent to ‘snakes are scary to 
me’. Perhaps combinations will help: Jones believes that snakes are scary to him, 
Jones wants to be far away from all snakes, and Jones fears that snakes will bite him. 
But all of this may be true and Jones might still fail to fear snakes. Jones might want to 
be away from them because he thinks they tend to explode (it’s explosions that make 
him nervous, not snakes as such), the prospect of being bitten may sound bad to him 
on the grounds that he doesn’t want fang marks on his skin before the big swimsuit 
competition, and, again, his belief may be explained by bad therapy. So, a person with 
the whole set of proposed propositional attitudes may not fear snakes.!
! Another example furthers the point. Suppose that if Jim likes Jackie this requires 
that Jim stand in some propositional attitude relation or other to some proposition or 
other concerning Jackie. But what propositional attitude will meet the requirement? One 
might suggest that Jim wouldn’t like Jackie if he didn’t think she existed, so perhaps 
believing that Jackie exists could serve as a first pass suggestion. But is this belief 
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sufficient for Jim’s liking of Jackie? Quite obviously it is not. But how might we do 
better? Jim believes that Jackie is nice? Jim likes that Jackie is kind? Let us just grant 
that both are true of Jim. Not only are they probably not necessary, but 
counterexamples to their sufficiency are still forthcoming. And combining the candidates 
doesn’t seem to help: Jim believes that Jackie is kind, he hopes that she gets a good 
job, he likes that she helps the needy, but for all of that, he can’t stand her. With just a 
bit of reflection, it strikes one that offering a sufficient condition in every case is anything 
but easy.!
! Propositionalists, even those who adopt Propositionalism B, have a hard row to 
hoe – for every non-propositional attitude the propositionalist must offer some or other 
sufficient propositional attitude (or attitudes). If a better candidate propositional attitude 
(or attitudes) is available than those just considered, it is now up to the propositionalist 
to offer it. Although there may be some cases in which being in certain propositional 
attitudes is sufficient for being in a non-propositional attitude,  the outlook for the much 18
stronger claim that this is always so is grim.!
Line 2!
! In order to set up my case, I will first introduce an experiment that makes salient 
the possibility of a certain variety fearing: dispositional fear in the absence of any 
occurrent experiences of fear. The important point to be taken away from the 
experiment is that it is possible for a creature to be in a non-occurrent state of fear 
without ever having undergone an occurrent episode of fear (which might, for all I say, 
be a propositional attitude).  Being innate is one way to accomplish this.!19
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! Smith (1977) has constructed an experiment involving a species of bird known as 
the great kiskadee, which eats, among other things, small reptiles. Concomitant with the 
kiskadee is the micrurus, a highly venomous snake which displays a distinctive coral-
snake pattern – a pattern composed of wide red, narrow yellow, wide black, and narrow 
yellow rings, in that order. If a kiskadee is bitten by a micrurus, death is likely.!
! In the experiment, six young kiskadees were raised in captivity and presented 
with wooden dowels painted in various ways. Some of the dowels were painted with 
rings of various colors and widths and others with stripes of various colors and widths. 
For instance, one set of dowels was painted with rings geometrically like that of the 
micrurus though colored differently. Other dowels covered similar options with striped 
patterns rather than rings. And, of course, one set of dowels was painted to resemble 
the micrurus as closely as possible. Young kiskadees were then presented with the 
various dowels and the number of pecks on each was recorded.!
! Importantly, the kiskasdees used in the experiment were taken from their nests 
just after their eyes were opened, and Smith points out that the natural nests are fully 
covered. Despite a general lack of worldly experience, the kiskadees exhibited behavior 
that suggests they have an innate fear of the micrurus. As Smith notes, the birds gave 
high intensity alarm calls to the coral-snake models, but not to other models.!
! With Smith’s experiment in the background, a thought experiment involving 
creatures with a more robust cognitive life who are propositional-attitude-identical 
though distinct with respect to one of their intentional relations can be constructed.!
! Suppose that there are two ancient populations of creatures, A and B inhabiting 
distinct planets that are as similar as possible given the following. Population A has 
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evolved in an environment in which a certain sort of snake claims many lives. Over the 
course of many generations, all the creatures have evolved such that upon the 
presentation of this type of snake they illicit fear responses – wide eyes, arched backs, 
gasping, running away, and so on. It is true of each member of the population that he or 
she fears snakes. In population B, on the other hand, there is no such threat and many 
normal members of that population don’t react fearfully when presented with snakes. !
! Imagine that we remove a set of identical twins from each population and that 
they are raised from birth in identical environments. Let us call the twins from population 
A ‘Aaron’ and ‘Adam’ and the twins from population B ‘Benson’ and ‘Barry’. All four of 
the creatures learn the same language and have qualitatively identical lives. Each of 
them is willing to openly and freely assent to ‘snakes aren’t dangerous’ and each of 
them has expressed a desire to see a real snake. In fact, when they are told there are 
snakes nearby, they become excited and start to look for them and behave as one 
would who desires to see a snake. All four sincerely report the same desires, beliefs, 
intentions, wishes, hopes, and so on and all four behave in ways that suggest that they 
want the same things, believe the same things, and so on. But suppose that one day we 
present Aaron and Benson with the type of snake that is known to threaten tribe A and 
find that Aaron, but not Benson, reacts fearfully. Despite their similarities, this seems 
possible (if not probable).!
! Intuitively, there is something it is like for Aaron in that situation and something it 
is like for Benson in that situation. According to many theorists, their experiences 
involve propositional attitudes,  so there are very likely a lot of propositional differences 20
between Aaron and Benson during the time the snake is present. Or one might suggest 
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that at the very moment the snake is presented, Aaron (causally or miraculously) comes 
to desire to be away from snakes. If desire is indeed a propositional attitude, then we 
would have a propositional difference. Let us grant all of this.!
! Turn now to Adam and Barry, neither of whom are presented with a snake at any 
time. They have undergone exactly the same experiences at every turn and both assent 
to the same sentences, express the same desires, and so on. It seems reasonable to 
conclude, given the known behavior of the two tribes and the experiment just run on 
Aaron and Benson, that Adam fears snakes but Barry does not. Much like a kiskadee 
that fears snakes before encountering any, Adam, but not Barry, sitting quietly in his 
room, fears snakes. Importantly, Adam and Barry seem to be propositionally identical – 
they appear to want the same things and believe the same things, they have seen and 
heard the same things, and so on. All of our best evidence for the presence of 
propositional attitudes suggests that the creatures are propositionally the same.  If 21
there is an unreported or otherwise hidden propositional attitude that accounts for the 
difference between them, the burden is on the propositionalist to say what it is. !22
! There is nothing special about fear; similar thought experiments are available for 
other intentional relations as well – loving, hating, liking, and perhaps others. If this is 
correct, then there are some non-propositional attitudes that do not depend on 
propositional attitudes in the way suggested by the propositionalist.!
! Now, there is a dialectical delicacy to which I alluded at the beginning of this 
section. If one comes to the case just offered as a staunch propositionalist, one might 
reasonably take the case to show that there simply must be another propositional 
attitude lurking. Unless one is already committed to Propositionalism, I can’t see why 
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one would endorse this position. We are given folk-psychological ascriptions that play 
their usual role and which do not appear to ascribe relations to propositions, so I take it 
that the burden is on the propositionalist to offer up the attitude or attitudes. Further, in 
light of line 1, we have been given reason to think this won’t always be possible. If, on 
the other hand, one comes to the case with an open mind concerning the truth of 
Propositionalism (and given the prima facie pressures against Propositionalism this 
seems to me the proper stance), the case should give one very good reason to reject 
Propositionalism B.!
Conclusion!
! Given our folk-psychological practices of ascribing what appear to be non-
propositional attitudes, and given the failure of both Propositionalism A and B, we 
should conclude that there are attitudes which relate individuals to non-propositional 
objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. Fearing and liking are 
plausible examples. In philosophy, we also make use of relations such as being 
conscious of, attending to, knowing by acquaintance, seeing, and grasping (in Frege’s 
sense), just to name a few. These relations are arguably intentional and they appear, at 
least on their face, to be non-propositional. The existence of non-propositional attitudes 
such as fearing and liking help pave the way for taking seriously the claim that other 
relations of great philosophical interest may also fail to be propositional. Of course, if all 
intentionality were, at bottom, propositional, our lives might seem easier for our theory 
of mind would be more parsimonious. But despite a desire for ease, theorists must take 
non-propositional attitudes seriously in their own right. Promising future work on 
intentionality lies in offering a positive account of these non-propositional attitudes. !23
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 Intentionalists about experience aim to break this divide by accounting for experiences 1
wholly in terms of content. Intentionalists often couch their view in terms of propositional 
content. For instance, Byrne (2001) explicitly argues that perceptual experience is a 
propositional attitude. See fn. 20 below for additional sources related to this movement.
 Traces of this type of line can be found in Davidson (1963) and in Lewis (1979).2
 See Heck (2000) and Speaks (2005) for helpful, recent discussions, though the 3
literature on non-conceptual content is rapidly growing since its introduction by Evans 
(1982). In the existing literature, attention is focused on whether or not the objects of the 
relevant attitudes are conceptual or not. There seems to be little attention paid to 
whether or not they are propositional – that feature is generally taken for granted by 
both parties in the dispute. For a recent exception see Heck (2007) who entertains the 
possibility of pictorial content.
 Some contemporary proponents of a ‘Russellian’ theory of descriptions and quantifiers 4
more generally adopt Russell’s truth-conditions but give up the position that the phrases 
fail to denote. For example, a type theoretic semantics can assign semantic values to 
quantified noun phrases and could be used to avoid commitment to Propositionalism. 
See Barwise and Cooper (1981) for a helpful and important discussion of quantification 
in natural language.
 See Bealer (1993) for a detailed discussion of both the historical and contemporary 5
uses of ‘intentional’. He takes the contemporary definition to be the one offered in the 
main text (Bealer (1993), 104).
 There is no doubt that a full account of the attitudes must say something about the 6
empty cases, for it seems possible to (say) fear things that don’t exist. That is, it may not 
be the case that for every intentional phenomenon there is something such that the 
phenomenon is about it (though often the reasoning goes through). My focus will be on 
the cases in which it does go through. !!
Since (say) fearing Zeus is psychologically similar to fearing Obama, there is pressure 
to give a uniform account of the empty and non-empty cases. A full discussion deserves 
a paper-length treatment, though just to sketch some options, one might suggest that 
the objects of fearing, liking, and so on (in both empty and non-empty cases) aren’t 
ordinary objects but are something like sub-propositional object-presentations 
(something akin to a concept, a sense, or a word-like representation in the language of 
thought). Alternatively, one might argue that fictional and mythical characters are real 
objects, but are abstract rather than concrete (see, for instance, Salmon (1998), 
Thomasson (2003), Van Inwagen (2003)) or are perhaps non-existent but real (this is 
famously the view of Meinong though contemporary advocates can be found in Priest 
(2005) and Routley (1980)). Such strategies preserve the relational nature, which is 
desirable given that states like fear are plausibly relations. See below in the main text 
for a defense of relationality.
 For additional reasons and a fuller discussion of those offered, see Fodor (1983) and 7
Schiffer (2003).
 If one agrees that sentences of the form ‘S A’s that p’ are true iff S A’s that p, the move 8
from language to metaphysics (though not irresistible) looks hard to deny. One could 
perhaps maintain that although the ascriptions are relational, the attitudes themselves 
are not. Robert Matthews (2007) has explored such a view, likening propositional 
attitude ascriptions to measure theoretic sentences.
  Alternatively, one might stop short of a metaphysical discussion and argue, as 9
‘Sententialists’ do, that the best semantics for sentences like 1-4 reveal hidden 
sentential structure in the object position. Although such a view is plausible in a limited 
number of cases (e.g. ‘to want’ and ‘to need’), the view lacks motivation in many other 
instances and often seems to get things wrong. The verbs in 1-4 are among the 
problem cases for Sententialists. For arguments against Sententialism, see Forbes 
(2006), Partee (1974), and Szabó (2003, 2005). For contemporary proponents of 
Senentialism, see Larson, et. al. (1997) and Larson (2002). An historical proponent can 
be found in Quine (1960).
 There may be intermediary positions as well, though these two versions aim to carve 10
out the upper and lower bounds of the view.
 As noted at the outset, Propositionalism B (or something very close to it) is held by 11
Bealer (1982, 1993) and Sainsbury (2010). Crane (2001) and Montague (2007) both, on 
behalf of their opponents, mention the position but then claim that it is to give up 
Propositionalism. I disagree, as do some propositionalists (via conversation).
 A full discussion of supervenience would take us too far astray. See Bennett and 12
McLaughlin (2005) for a detailed discussion.
 That the non-propositional attitudes might globally supervene on the propositional 13
attitudes would be an importantly distinct position. According to such a position, it would 
be impossible for two subjects in distinct worlds to differ in their non-propositional, 
intentional relations without there being some or other propositional attitude differences 
somewhere (or somewhen) in the worlds they inhabit. If such a position were 
established, there would be an interesting debate about whether the global 
supervenience of the non-propositional attitudes on the propositional attitudes is 
asymmetric. As far as I can tell, deciding on this last point would demand determining 
whether the most fundamental units of meaning are propositional or sub-propositional. 
Though interesting, the present debate is not that debate. At issue here is whether or 
not any attitudinal relations relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do so not 
in virtue of relating them to propositions.
 Montague (2007) offers similar counterexamples against Propositionalism and I am 14
indebted to her paper, though as noted above she fails to discuss Propositionalism B.
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 There is, however, a question as to whether any seemingly non-propositional 15
attitudes might be open to a propositionalist treatment of this sort. I suspect some are, 
but the present dialectic demands only that some aren’t.
 See Forbes (2006) for a similar point concerning fear.16
 I admit that there is some intuitive draw. One might suggest, for example, that if one 17
likes y, surely there is something that one likes about y or that one believes about y, or if 
one fears y there must be something about y that one fears or perhaps that one 
believes or desires. But the plausibility of this suggestion rests, I suspect, on a 
conflation between having a reason for an attitude and accounting (in a metaphysical 
sense) for that attitude. I might like Sally because I like that she is nice to me and I 
might fear Bill the bully because I fear that he is going to beat me up, but in both cases 
these are reasons for having an attitude and aren’t obviously what my attitude consists 
in.
 For instance, both Sainsbury (2010) and Prior (1971) suggest that in order to think 18
about y, there is nothing more required than thinking that y is F. This is indeed a 
tempting claim (though, interestingly, less temping, I think, for thinking-of).
 Or at least involve propositional attitudes. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003), for instance, 19
argue that at least some occurrent emotions are compound states constituted by both 
propositional attitudes and felt qualities. The issue of felt qualities seems to be beside 
the point when non-occurrent fear is at issue. One who non-occurrently fears, say, 
snakes may fear them even while comfortably asleep or in a coma.
 Both intentionalists and ‘qualia-freaks’, for example, maintain that experiences have 20
propositional content. Byrne (2001), Dretske (1997, 2003), Lycan (1996), Pautz (2009, 
2010), Siegel (2010), Thau (2002), and Tye (1995, 2002) are representative of the 
intentionalist camp. Block (1996), Peacocke (1983), and Shoemaker (1990) are 
representative of the qulia-freak line. For general dissent, see Alston (1998), Brewer 
(2006), and Travis (2004).
 One might be tempted to look to the attitudes of the creatures’ ancestors. Surely the 21
ancestors of Adam and Barry are propositionally distinct and this distinction in part 
explains why Adam and Barry differ. But see the earlier discussion of local 
supervenience for reasons for thinking that pointing to the attitudes of individuals other 
than Adam and Barry is to miss the spirit of Propositionalism.
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 It has been suggested to me that if Adam imagined that a snake is present, he might 22
become afraid and that this might constitute the needed difference. First, this is not at all 
obvious, for one might imagine hitting a large ski jump or bungee jumping and not find 
himself at all scared while imagining, but then be stricken with fear when faced with the 
real opportunity. I myself have experienced this. Second, we may stipulate that none of 
the twins bother to do any imagining. For that matter, we could (without loss) say that 
they lack imaginative capacities altogether.!!
It has also been suggested to me that it is constitutive of fearing that one desire such 
and such, that one be away from what is feared, for example. Though it does seem 
unlikely that one would fear, say, snakes and not want to be away from them when 
presented with one (even if that desire were overridden by, say, the desire to conquer 
one’s fear), constitution doesn’t seem to be the right relation. It seems that it is because 
one fears snakes that one wants to be away from snakes. The fear of snakes causes 
one to want to be away from them. This is evidenced by the fact that when one asks 
why one wants to be away from snakes, ‘I fear them’ is a satisfactory answer. If fearing 
snakes was (at least partially) constituted by a desire to be away from them, this answer 
would be wholly unsatisfying. It would be similar to the unsatisfactory nature of Molière’s 
‘explanation’ of why the pill makes one sleepy in terms of it’s dormitive virtue.
 Thank you to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that led to substantial 23
improvements. Many thanks are also due to the following friends and colleagues: Mark 
Sainsbury, Michael Tye, Josh Dever, Ray Buchanan, Ian Proops, Adam Pautz, Hans 
Kamp, David Sosa, Steve James, Kate Ritchie, Reid Blackman, Alex Baia, Jeremy 
Evans, John Bengson, Brian Cutter, Neil Sinhababu, Ted Parent, and audience 
members at the 2010 Pacific APA.
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